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Reviewed by Lea Vaughn
Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility in 
American Legal Culture, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2016: 
pp. 400, $46.50 (cloth)
Leaves, Leaves, lean forth and tell me what I am.
—Theodore Roethke, “The Sequel,” The Far Field
“There are three things that might be meant by ‘the emergence of the 
modern mind’: fi rst, the emergence of modern ways of thinking about the 
universe; second, the emergence of modern conceptions of the mind; and third, 
the emergence of the mind itself with its distinctive human characteristics.”1 
The very ambiguity of this attributive property, or defi nitional conundrum, 
hints at the diffi  culty of writing about the mind, and by necessary implication, 
human nature. Add to this that “the mind” is contested territory. Generations 
of theologians, philosophers, scientists and doctors, and jurists have fought 
over which discipline will control the defi nitional contours of “ the mind.” 
For the law, who controls the act of defi ning “the mind” and the scope of 
its defi nition is fraught with consequence. The presence of a capable mind, 
however defi ned, marks the boundaries of legal culpability in both criminal 
and civil law.
Into this thicket walks legal historian Susanna Blumenthal, and in a 
masterful study titled Law and the Modern Mind,2 simultaneously both describes 
1. Colin McGinn, Groping Toward the Mind, N.Y. REV. BOOKS , June 23, 2016, at 67. Like the 
book reviewed here, the two books addressed in McGinn’s review survey the emergence of 
“the modern mind.” His review raises some of the same questions Blumenthal asks: “Was 
madness a matter of possession by demons and lapses into vice, and hence the province 
of theology and the clergy, or was it a matter for medical men trained in anatomy and 
physiology?” Id. Similarly, Blumenthal casts this as a dialogue between law and medicine, 
including the nascent fi eld of psychology. As such, she is raising McGinn’s second category—
the emergence of modern, and arguably secular, conceptions of the mind.
2. SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (2016) [hereinafter LMM]. Note 
that Blumenthal intentionally borrows the same title from Jerome Frank’s LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND (1930). As Frank did with his book, Blumenthal seeks to upset the apple cart 
of legal certainty. To the extent that they both look at the law as actually decided, rather than 
fi t it into a particular legal theory, their books have a certain similarity. That is, both writers 
focus on the subjectivity of the law, and on individual cases and jurists. While Frank focused 
on the judge, Blumenthal looks at the judicial product in an attempt to see how the product 
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the battles among scientists, doctors, and jurists in the period following the 
Revolutionary War and up through the Gilded Age, and takes on traditional 
scholarship in legal history as to who this person or “mind” is. Her study not 
only provides an alternative account of the formation of American character, 
but also provides a series of detailed portraits of the various turning points 
in the formation of that character, and the legal determination of capable, 
accountable personhood.
This review essay will proceed in three parts followed by a conclusion that 
assesses the success and contribution of her work. The fi rst section sketches 
her approach to legal history and her point of view. Professor Blumenthal 
takes on the monumental task of challenging the received wisdom of legal 
historians such as Willard Hurst. Second, this review will paint a condensed 
portrait of Blumenthal’s methodology. Her book and its underlying analysis 
draw on a breathtaking base of source materials: Hundreds of cases, treatises, 
and biographical notes are woven into her observations. The careful depiction 
and analysis of these materials is central to establishing her thesis: that the 
traditional account of the development of American law, as a unitary response 
defi nes consciousness and a defi nition of legally accountable actors. Whether Blumenthal 
wishes to be seen as writing in that realist tradition, however, remains to be seen. That 
she resists categorization appears more clearly in her 1998 article; her description of Frank 
applies equally to herself:
To create, Jerome Frank pronounced in Law and the Modern Mind, was emphatically the 
province and duty of the judiciary. Setting himself in opposition to the nineteenth-
century legal tradition, Frank exposed the discretionary, unpredictable nature of the 
judicial process. He derided previous generations for their idealizing tendencies, 
which had led them to posit the existence of a superhuman, passionless judge—
one who mechanically applied a stationary and certain set of legal rules to the cases 
brought before him. This vision of adjudication was nothing more than an illusion, 
Frank maintained, and persisting belief in it was explicable in psychological terms. 
 Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 151, 152 (1998) 
(citations omitted). Her 1998 article also announces themes that underlie much of the book 
under review. As she stated in that article:
The third and most recent line of historical scholarship questions the very utility of 
such labels as “instrumentalism,” “formalism,” and “realism,” providing illustrations 
of their inadequacy as applied to a particular individual or historical era, and, in some 
cases, off ering alternative terminology. 
This article extends the critique of these categories of analysis, demonstrating that 
judicial lawmaking was a constant from 1800 to 1930. What changed, it is contended, 
was the conception of the creative process entailed in the act of judging. At the turn of 
the nineteenth century, creative acts were still primarily associated with divine power. 
However, by mid-century, the power of creation was commonly attributed to human 
actors—“without necessary reference to a past divine event.” This shift in usage can 
best be understood as a manifestation of the infl uence of romanticism in American 
culture. 
 Id. at 156 (citations omitted). In that article, she contested the views of G. Edward White 
as well as the legal historians who argued that this period demonstrated movement from 
“instrumentalism” to “formalism.” The romanticism to which she refers is the shift from the 
sacred to the secular, and her study looks at the impact of this romanticism on American 
legal thought. Although her book does not speak in the same terms, one could regard it as 
the mature expression of that earlier article, with an expanded cast of characters.
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to wealth accumulation and the growth of the industrial society, paints a false 
portrait of unanimity of opinion. Rather, she argues, jurists were faced with 
competing accounts of the mind and legal responsibility; more often than 
not they chose pragmatically among these accounts, so it is overly simplistic 
to characterize American legal developments as a unitary or linear march of 
progress. Importantly, in contrast to the usual approaches in the legal history 
literature that focus on criminal law, Blumenthal turns her attention to cases in 
the areas of wills, family law, contracts (particularly insurance contracts), and 
torts. Finally, the third part of this review will outline what is one of the most 
powerful, and, in my mind, important contributions of her book—an in-depth 
analysis of the intersection of law and medicine in the period under study. 
This analysis, as I will note, can be brought to bear on modern conversations 
involving law, genetics, and neuroscience.3 Some lessons about the use of 
science in law that emerge from her study are worth repeating. 
I.  The Project: Taking on American Legal History
As I have noted, Blumenthal has, perhaps slyly, titled her book in the same 
manner as Jerome Frank, another leading legal historian who in 1930 authored 
Law and the Modern Mind. And in an acknowledgment of the connectiveness of 
history, she begins her book with a quotation from Oliver Wendell Holmes 
that nicely captures the central theme of her own work: “In a proper sense, the 
state of a man’s consciousness always is material to his liability” (1).4  Reviewing 
materials from the Revolutionary War and the Gilded Age, Blumenthal traces 
out how the insinuation of Enlightenment ideas in law and science informed 
legal thinking and in turn drew the contours of modern accountability and 
responsibility. Although she speaks at various points of the default legal person 
(DLP) and of Holmes’s “reasonable man,” she is actually, through studies of 
insanity, trying to outline the contours of who is, in the law of the time, the 
responsible, accountable “self.” As she states, she “explores the problematic 
relationship between consciousness and liability in the history of American 
law . . . .” (2). As detailed below, Blumenthal has divided her work into two 
parts.5 The fi rst part of her book describes the intellectual underpinnings of 
the case analysis that informs the second part of her book.
3. The discussion in Part III will focus on neuroscience; the scope of this review and the 
author’s own competence require this narrower gaze. Consider, also: “Genetics may yet 
threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous, and gut the concept of human 
nature. But neuroscience could do all of these things fi rst.” The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your 
Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 72, 72.
4. She notes that this is an odd statement for a jurist whose project was to move us from 
subjective to objective standards, creating the “reasonable man” (now, reasonable person) 
as the benchmark for legal liability. (1) The Holmes quote is from Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). Blumenthal, however, sees herself as 
reversing Holmes’s emphasis on the reasonable person, instead looking at the default legal 
person standing behind Holmes’s creation (12)
5. Blumenthal’s book is drawn, in part, from her own previously published work. See, e.g., A Mania 
for Accumulation: The Plea of Moral Insanity in Gilded Age Will Contests, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON 181 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein eds., 
357Book Review: Law and the Modern Mind
At the close of the Revolution, the key challenge to the success of this 
experiment in governance was the “mental competence of citizens, on their 
ability to exercise a ‘rational liberty’ ” (5). As writings in almost any post-
Revolutionary fi eld demonstrate, creating a republic of free citizens,6 
governed by their consent and intelligence rather than by their status, was 
simultaneously liberating and disquieting. Many thinkers of the time, trying 
to channel this freedom, would look to the Common Sense philosophy of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, which provided a scientifi c confi rmation of the 
divine conferral of rational faculties.7 Into this setting Blumenthal places 
what she calls “ ‘the default legal person,’ modeled in accordance with the 
Enlightenment ‘science of man,’ ” (7)8 and living in the shadow of Holmes’s 
“average man.” “In the everyday legal culture lying just outside the jurist’s 
imagination, however, these exceptional persons were not so marginal. For 
even as Holmes wrote, American courtrooms were regularly confronted with 
capacity litigation.”9 Blumenthal, unlike Holmes, focuses on the “exceptional 
persons” who were the subject of capacity litigation in order to see what “free 
and independent man” would emerge from the chains of status and rank. She 
notes that this reversal of emphasis on the “default legal person” leads to four 
points of diff erence between her DLP and Holmes’s average man:
1. The DLP marks the border of legal capacity, rather than a bundle of 
expectations for conduct.
2. While failing to behave reasonably led to liability, behaving like a DLP 
would typically led to a “suspension or mitigation of liability” (12).
3. The DLP is a descriptive model—he is the “precondition[] of liability,” 
(12) while Holmes’s reasonable man is prescriptive, determined by the 
limits of the law. 
2013); “Death by His Own Hand”: Accounting for Suicide in Nineteenth-Century Life Insurance Litigation, 
in SUBJECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: FRAMING PERSONHOOD IN MODERN BUREAUCRACIES 98 
(Andrew Parker, Austin Sarat & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2011); The Mind of the Moral 
Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century American Law, 26 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 99 (2008);  The Default Legal Person, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2007) [hereinafter 
Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person]; The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary 
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959 (2006).
6. As noted below, Blumenthal makes it clear at various points that these citizens were white 
males, and generally property holders.
7. Although Blumenthal addresses the role that religion plays in the formation of the American 
“mind,” it is not a major theme of her work. She notes that over time, legal thinkers moved 
from the constraints of Calvinism to a more liberal and broadly couched Protestantism. 
Passim, but see e.g., LMM 22, 33–34. 42–44.
8. Her articulation of this concept is clearer in her article that informs this chapter. Using 
Holmes’s “average man,” almost as a foil, she points out that judges “could not see men 
as God sees them.” Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, supra note 6, at 1137 (quoting O.W. 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881)).
9. Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, supra note 6, at 1138.
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4. Finally, the DLP has “no particular point of view of his own;” rather he 
moves “chameleon-like . . . from case to case”10 (12).
Blumenthal documents the travails of the default legal person as he moves 
through the late eighteenth and nineteenth century in order to account for 
what judges were really doing in this period. She states, in her article:
In eff ecting these transpositions, they [judges] suggested that the men-
tal attributes one needed to be a competent legal actor depended upon the 
nature of the act involved—whether it was a will, contract, or tort. So, in the 
law of wills it was deemed to be essential that the default legal person had the 
cognitive and emotional capacity to remember and feel the family ties that 
bound him as he disposed of his estate, while in the law of contracts it was 
more important that he possessed the ability to make intelligent judgments on 
the basis of his own self-interest. Within the law of torts, however, he would 
assume several distinct forms. In some instances, he had to be able to form 
a malicious intent, but in others, he needed only to be capable of exercising 
prudence and foresight; in still others it was enough if he had the capacity to 
harm. Yet wherever he stood in nineteenth-century American common law, 
the default legal person embodied a mental threshold, serving to illustrate the 
preconditions of responsibility, so far as the law was concerned.11
Inherent in this approach is Blumenthal’s challenge to conventional legal 
history, which she views as being told largely in “socioeconomic terms” (16). 
Rather than viewing doctrinal developments through the lens of economic 
development and the approach of the Civil War, Blumenthal prefers to look 
at the religious and scientifi c infl uences on the work of the law, believing that 
the concern for an “objective law” had “deeper spiritual roots and higher 
ideological stakes than previous scholars have recognized”12 (16). For her, the 
person is not only an object of capitalist forces; she sees the person as subject 
to his or her own frailties as well as the fl uidity of social, economic, and legal 
relationships at the time (16). This journey is not linear, as is typically depicted 
in legal history. Through the numerous capacity hearings she chronicles, she 
10. This point becomes central later in her book; basically, the legal defi nition of capacity is 
contingent on the area of law, e.g., contracts, torts, through which the DLP traverses. 
11. Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, supra note 6, at 1140.
12. Thus, Blumenthal rejects the accounts of legal historians such as Morton Horowitz, Jerold 
Auerbach, and Grant Gilmore who see the formalism of the period as an outgrowth of the 
economics of the time. See generally MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); Grant Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Robert 
Cover and William Nelson provide a competing account, focusing on the Civil War and 
jurists’ attempts to look to rules of human behavior, values, and religion to justify changes 
in the law. See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1976); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial 
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974). Holmes, in The Path of the Law, 
in a sense combines both approaches of his contemporaries, drawing on economic analysis 
as well as the arguments of the anti-slavery formalists. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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wants to show the reader the “general lack of clarity about the operative norms 
of behavior in the household and the market” (16). In the end, not only does 
she paint a portrait of the preconditions of legal freedom (i.e., a defi nition of 
modern mind and personhood), but she also allows the law to make room 
for the preconditions of the American character as the courts stepped back 
from constraining behavior, “leaving individuals freer, in a certain sense, to 
act on their own ideas and impulses, however eccentric, perverse, or just plain 
foolish” (17).
Her model of legal history is set forth in Chapter 1, “Common Sense and 
Common Law” (26–58). In this chapter, she chronicles the fascination of 
American jurists with the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment and its Common 
Sense13 philosophy, especially those articulated by Thomas Reid (26–29). 
This philosophy, with its focus on the ability to self-make and improve one’s 
character through rational processes, was especially appealing to the founding 
generation, concerned as it was with the freedom unleashed by the Revolution 
(42–44). Here Blumenthal begins to question more traditional legal history, 
that, she says, tends to focus on law releasing “creative human energy,” chiefl y 
toward the end of economic development (31). In her view, the traditional 
accounts have failed to look at prevailing philosophies of mind to plumb 
them for the ways in which they formed and constructed legal personhood. 
By contrast, “[t]he mental philosophers and their disciplinary techniques are 
placed front and center here” (31). The Common Sense philosophy of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, she argues, was central to the project of allowing the 
new citizens of the republic to develop the self-knowledge that would make 
self-mastery in the face of tremendous freedom possible(42–47). To that end, 
she focuses on James Wilson (1742–1798) who in 1766 brought Common Sense 
philosophy to America, and was part of the movement from a strict Calvinist 
approach of moral blameworthiness to, ultimately, a more forgiving liberal 
Protestantism (33–36). By focusing on Reid and Wilson, Blumenthal deftly 
but carefully demonstrates the rising hegemony of Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy, and how it challenged the idea that responsibility was purely 
cognitive or intellectual; that it could also be based on an “excess of passion 
rather than a defect of understanding, as it had long been defi ned at common 
law” (41).14 Nonetheless, this view, based on science and religion, had a deep 
belief in the ability of people to pursue a virtuous life, contrasted with the 
Calvinist belief in “innate human depravity.” Common Sense philosophers 
gave more room for human improvement through the exercise of “mental 
ability” (42–43). This focus on improvement fi t nicely with the concerns about 
the vast freedoms given to citizens; exercise of our mental abilities would 
allow us to make the best use of the freedoms that had been aff orded by the 
Revolution.
13. One interesting point that Blumenthal makes is that the exaltation of “Common Sense” 
becomes small-case “common sense” by the arrival of the Gilded Age.
14. Citing 3 THOMAS REID, THE WORKS OF THOMAS REID: WITH AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND 
WRITINGS 39–41 (Dugald Stewart ed., New York, Duyckinkck et al., 1822).
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While Common Sense philosophy spurred a great deal of American self-
improvement movements, the philosophy also had the seeds of its own demise 
because for jurists, Common Sense philosophy did not provide a clear division 
between depravity and disease (50). From this belief in the capacities of the mind 
for self-improvement and self-government emerged the default legal person, 
who had the capacity for self-knowledge and determination. Challenging 
but never fully displacing the British notion of personhood, “[t]he default 
legal person stood as the embodiment of widely shared assumptions about 
human agency and accountability, constituting a part of the common sense of 
the American legal profession in the nineteenth century” (55). Thus, “mental 
soundness” was a “legitimate means of discriminating between theoretically 
equal individuals for all sorts of legal purposes,” because it supported the 
new American legal structure in which “mental ability rather than social status 
constituted the primary determinant of legal capacity and responsibility” (57).
What this philosophy could not always answer was whether the legal acts of 
individuals were a refl ection of intentional self-determination, albeit eccentric, 
or of a disease, rendering them legally unaccountable (58). To this end, 
Blumenthal, in one of her most singular historical contributions, surveys the 
role that the medical jurisprudence of insanity placed in the law, in Chapter 
2 of the fi rst part of her book. As will be dealt with in more detail below, 
Blumenthal uses the writings of Dr. Benjamin Rush and the alienists to sketch 
out how medical expertise, in the form of treatises and testimony, contributed 
to the fl eshing out of the default legal person.
The ambitious second part of her book is a veritable travelogue of 
adjudicated civil capacity cases that demonstrate her point that judges 
“muddled”15 through determinations of personhood, as opposed to acting 
15. William Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling 
the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 311–14, 311 at n.47 (1980-81) for the sources cited there 
on “muddling through”. Rodgers’ article is directed at judicial perceptions of the forms 
of reasoning used by administrative agencies in making decisions: classical, rational/
formal, and the “theory of successive limited comparisons.” He renames the third theory 
less elegantly as the “science of muddling through.” Although he is applying this model to 
agency behavior, Blumenthal essentially, although in a more carefully documented manner, 
describes judges in the period studied as performing the same analysis. Rodgers argues, 
as does Blumenthal, that agencies and judges tend to use a “hybrid” approach to decision-
making that combines features of the classical model (freewheeling proxy for the legislature) 
and the rational (the administrator identifi es alternatives, projecting consequences to 
make the best decision; less political and more scientifi c). As this applies to Blumenthal, 
she is arguing that legal history has missed the boat in forcing judicial decisions into one 
model; rather, judges tend to decide pragmatically based on the evidence before them and 
the doctrine at issue rather than as against some grand philosophy. As Rodgers would 
say, “decisionmaking is a process of strategic adaptation over time, incremental advance, 
and partial resolution . . . . Decisionmaking by the muddlers is a process that bends with 
the breeze, rolls with the punch, runs for daylight. It works by fi ts and starts, by fl oating 
proposals, by reworking them to blunt anguished objections, by amendment over time.” 
Id. at 312. Obviously, nineteenth-century jurists are not modern governmental agencies but 
as described by Blumenthal their dilemma is much the same—given the shifting sands of 
science and medicine, how does one make an incapacity decision in the case before the 
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from some grand philosophy. As developed in greater detail below, Blumenthal 
surveys an amazing number of cases to demonstrate how judges dealt with 
the contending philosophies laid out in the fi rst part of the book. Again and 
again, judges struggled with drawing a line between sane and insane, capable 
or not accountable. 
II. Methodology: Speaker for the Dead and the Insane
In Speaker for the Dead,16 Ender Wiggin, in an act of atonement, undertakes a 
life mission to “speak” the truth about the dead as he performs their eulogy—
the good, the bad, and the ambiguities of each person’s existence. “Who was 
this speaker, and how did he know so much about things he could not possibly 
have known?”17 In a like manner, the dead speak through Blumenthal, telling 
us the tale of how modern American legal consciousness was born. The success 
of the new republic rested on its citizens, and their moral agency. In this case, 
she brings to life, in an unvarnished fashion, at least four groups of actors who 
inform the development of consciousness (or legal capacity), and conferrals of 
agency, from 1750 to 1900. The fi rst group, the focus of her study, is the litigants 
in estate, contract, family law, and tort cases that provide the gist of her book, 
and from which her thesis is tested and proved. The second group contains 
populations that are typically disenfranchised in legal scholarship: married 
women and slaves. In fact, one of the remarkable contributions of her book 
is to acknowledge that the shaping of the American mind takes place in the 
shadow of the disenfranchisement of these two groups. A third group of actors 
court at a particular moment in time? The beauty of Blumenthal’s analysis is that she shows, 
through her case vignettes, nineteenth-century jurists “muddling through.”
16. ORSON SCOTT CARD, SPEAKER FOR THE DEAD (1986, 1991)[The author is using the 1991 
“author’s defi nitive edition.]. Those who are familiar with Card’s book ENDER’S GAME 
(2006) know that Ender Wiggin, the main character in that book, was responsible for the 
genocide of an entire species. What is less well-known is that Ender’s Game was intended as 
a character study or prequel for what was intended to be Card’s main work in Speaker for the 
Dead. See “Introduction” at  ix to xxii. Relevant also to the power of Blumenthal’s work is 
this note of similarity between her close analysis of cases and the work of the Speaker:
The Speaker had done a monstrous thing, to lay these secrets before the whole 
community. They should have been spoken in the confessional. Yet Peregrino had 
felt the power of it, the way the whole community was forced to discover these people 
that they thought they knew, and then discover them again, and then again: and each 
revision of the story forced them all to reconceive themselves as well, for they had been 
part of this story, too, had been touched by all the people a hundred, a thousand times, 
never understanding until now who it was they touched. It was a painful, fearful thing 
to go through, but in the end it had a curiously calming eff ect. The Bishop leaned to 
his secretary and whispered, “At least the gossips will get nothing from this—there 
aren’t any secrets left to tell.”
 Id. at 269. This comparison, between Law and the Modern Mind and Speaker for the Dead, is meant 
with respectful seriousness. While the former is styled as a legal history, there is also a sense, 
like the latter, that it is an anthropology, and that she lays bare the lives of the litigants, 
medical experts, and jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That is, she lets 
history speak for itself from the cases rather than imposing an interpretive framework from 
one of the legal history theories.
17. Card (1991 ed.), id. at 263.
362 Journal of Legal Education
depicted in her careful study are the judges of the relevant period, who speak 
through their decisions in the cases that are discussed. Finally, as addressed in 
the next section, Blumenthal immerses the reader in a conversation between 
jurists and the emerging medical doctors who study the mind. In this section, 
the primary focus will be on the parties and the jurists in the cases, as this is 
the method by which she proceeds. Brief attention will also be given to the 
picture she draws of married women and slaves, who exist on the fringes of 
her narrative.
The second unique feature of her approach is a focus on cases that employ 
a challenge to one party’s sanity, or legal capacity. Blumenthal’s methodology 
is to track how jurists and the medical personnel who testifi ed in the courts 
defi ned insanity and therefore legal incapacity (the DLP). Unlike many works 
of legal history that focus on the criminal sphere, Blumenthal’s book focuses 
on the civil sphere in specifi c realms: challenges to wills, contracts voided 
for a lack of capacity, and divorce and tort liability where family members 
often contested the agency and psychological capacity of their loved ones. In 
moving from 1750 to 1900, she shows the reader how the law creates room for 
the eccentricities of the modern American character as it set the contours of 
legal capacity. 
Her focus on insanity is revealing, and part of her project is to reveal the 
“modern mind” and the contours of legal responsibility. By a type of “reverse 
engineering,” she uses the courts’ demarcation of capable personhood from 
insane to describe which people were legally moral agents. The study traces 
the many confl icting attitudes toward insanity in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century law: Was insanity a disease? Or, rather, was it a sign of moral depravity? 
Was it only to be defi ned by one’s ability to be rational? Or would it consider 
moral inclinations and sentiments? This focus is against the backdrop not just 
of the courts’ struggle with these cases, but also of the medical professions 
and the rise of the asylum. At the same time, she diagnoses the fundamental 
anxiety of the new republic: How can the law confer, and yet contain, so much 
freedom? That is, the American revolutionary project could be a success only 
if citizens could live up to the idea of ordered liberty. Success would be a 
moral, political and legal endeavor. 
A.  The Estate Cases
One of the singular contributions of Blumenthal’s book is her analysis of 
myriad capacity cases. “The analysis off ered in the chapters that form Part 2 is 
based upon over 800 published (usually appellate) opinions” (318 n.18).18 This 
strength, however, also makes it diffi  cult to summarize her book because these 
cases form the heart of the book; it is hard to pick one, especially since she 
18. She adds: “Many of these cases were identifi ed in the same way a nineteenth-century lawyer 
might have investigated the matter: by mining the notes of leading works on the medical 
jurisprudence of insanity as well as legal treatises devoted to discrete doctrinal areas.” (318 
n.18)
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surveys several areas of the law. This section will look at her fi rst case summary 
as an example of her method of analysis.
“By all accounts, George Moore was a dissolute bachelor who drank 
himself to death” (105).19 So begins Blumenthal’s fi rst account of an incapacity 
case. Moore had executed a will that disinherited his three brothers, but 
provided for his female slave, who was also described as his concubine.20 Not 
surprisingly, the three brothers of this childless man contested his will, arguing 
incapacity, undue infl uence, and fraud. They presented testimony about a 
fever that resulted in animus toward his brothers, while the will’s proponents 
called witnesses “who maintained that when this document was made Moore 
displayed suffi  cient intellect to competently dispose of his estate” (105). 
Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled against the will because 
it appeared that Moore’s concubine, to be emancipated upon his death, 
appeared to exert undue infl uence over him, and that his feelings against his 
brothers was seen as “a derangement in one department in his mind” (106). 
The basic facts of the case laid out, Blumenthal uses this narrative to regale the 
reader with the arguments on rehearing of proponents’ counsel, Joseph Cabell 
Breckinridge, who railed against the “new medical psychology” employed by 
the contestants that made it diffi  cult to tell the diff erence between “sin and 
disease” (106). Blumenthal uses this case to note that “the issues . . . posed 
recurred with disturbing regularity in the decades that followed, as litigation 
about ‘unnatural dispositions’ seemed to crowd court dockets in every state” 
(106).
The diff ering positions about incapacity established, Blumenthal uses 
each case as an entry point to analyze the context of the decision. In this 
particular case, she sees the decisions as evidence of “a concern that liberty 
might degenerate into licentiousness, particularly in a country that had 
repudiated so many of the traditional props of social order . . . .” (107). 
Canvassing the treatises at the time of the decision, she points out that the 
principles “of testamentary freedom and natural justice seemed perpetually 
in confl ict, forcing judges to confront the fact that liberty and morality did 
not necessarily lead all men in the same direction” (107). The stage set, she 
uses the next two chapters to illustrate the way in which testamentary capacity 
battles staked out claims between conventional morality and freedom. But 
she also goes deeper to use these cases as exemplars of her thesis that these 
cases “are best understood” as exposing the “tensions and ambiguities in the 
liberal conception of self-possession.” By presenting so many cases, followed 
by close and searching analysis, she describes how traditional legal history 
has “overstated the coherence and stability of the behavioral norms invoked” 
in this period (108). Her analysis not only carefully dissects each case in its 
historical context, but also seeks to reveal a vision of the human will in the civil 
context by looking not only at the cases but at the ideas of “[t]he new band of 
19. This is the fi rst account in the fi rst of her case analysis chapters. 
20. Johnson v. Moore’s Heirs, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 371, 371–72 (1822), referenced at LMM, supra note 2 
at 105 n.1. The ensuing description is drawn from id. at 105–07.
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medical men specializing in the diagnosis and treatment of mental alienation” 
who “promised a scientifi c basis for judgment” (109).21 It is the latter two foci 
that make her book unique among legal history texts; she focuses on civil cases, 
and introduces in a co-equal way the role of medical personnel in shaping the 
law of capacity.
B.  The Disenfranchised: Women and Slaves
As noted, those who suff ered from monomanias, delusions, and other 
infi rmities of the mind were excluded from legal personhood as the outcome 
of contested litigation. But the defi nition of legal personhood doesn’t 
begin and end with a fi nding of insanity. It is a credit to the broad ambit of 
Blumenthal’s scholarship that she also considers, in each chapter, the status 
of slaves and married women. She acknowledges from the outset that most 
of these cases involved white men of property (8).22 That this was the case, 
that white maleness was the baseline precondition of “presumed competence,” 
meant that “any sign that they had been unmanned could serve as the basis for 
claiming incapacity” (100). As noted above, many of her case studies shine a 
light on slavery and/or the role of women.
III. Past as Prologue: Science and Law, Then and Now
Antonio: . . . Who’s the next heir of Naples?
Sebastian: Claribel.
Antonio: She that is Queen of Tunis; she that dwells
Ten leagues beyond man’s life; she that from Naples
Can have no note, unless the sun were post—
The man i’ the moon’s too slow—till new-born chins
Be rough and razorable; she that—from whom
We all were sea-swallow’d, though some cast again
And by that destiny to perform an act
Whereof what’s past is prologue, what to come,
In yours and my discharge.23
One theme of this review essay, and undergirded by Blumenthal’s study, is 
that the fundamental question of who is a responsible agent has always vexed 
those in the law (as well as those in religion, philosophy, and science). By what 
theory of mind, in any given period of history, does the law determine that 
21. The question of the will, she notes, has long pre-occupied legal historians who study the 
criminal law. See, e.g., THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (2014).
22. From the beginning, she notes that the jurists of the period say liberty as consistent with 
a patriarchal hierarchy that meant a male head of household co-existing with slavery. 
Whiteness was the “default” race (8). “Since few white women and even fewer non-white 
women or men owned and controlled property, this bias stands to reason, even as it forces us 
to reckon with how many property holders perceived themselves or were perceived by others 
to be incapable of rationally managing their possessions” (100).
23. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1.
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we are responsible agents? And to what extent should the sciences (including 
medicine) be part of that eff ort? What should be the nature of the partnership 
between law and science? Although this book is clearly intended as a work of 
legal history, Blumenthal’s book can be read to also speak to contemporary 
debates in science and law, particularly in genetics and neuroscience.24 
Describing the work of scientists and medical personnel during that age is a 
key part of her study, and may be one of the most important contributions that 
her books make to legal (and medical) history.
Some readers of this review essay may have owned, as a child, a View-
Master. This toy was a modern descendant of the stereoscope, and one of 
its best salespeople was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (88). Invented in 1838, 
the stereoscope allows the viewer’s eyes to see two separate images that are 
then fused into one image in the brain, giving the image depth and richness.25 
Relying on the underlying metaphor of the stereoscope, Blumenthal tells the 
entwined contributions of medicine and law to the burgeoning nineteenth-
century understanding of insanity, and, like the stereoscope, gives the reader 
a much deeper and complex understanding of the role and defi nition of 
insanity in shaping American culture and law, and its view of human nature. 
Her account is told largely through the stories of Francis Wharton, a writer of 
treatises on medical jurisprudence, and John Ordronaux (1830-1908), a doctor 
with a law degree and a pioneer in asylum oversight who worked with lawyers 
to craft a better legal regime governing insanity.
Wharton, she writes, promised, like the stereoscope, to bring the focus of 
law and medicine into convergence. Unfortunately, she notes, Wharton’s study 
of “over 800 appellate decisions” showed more divergence than convergence 
regarding the law of insanity (90). By the 1870s, this confl ict between legal 
authorities and medical experts was apparent to the public in both criminal 
and civil capacity trials. Public skepticism about the soundness of law or 
medicine rose as insanity trials became fodder for newspapers, in which 
medical experts frequently disagreed with one another and lawyers appeared 
to hire “forensic psychologists [who] would say anything for a price” (90-91). 
These disputes were confounded by diff ering views about method between 
lawyers and doctors. Doctors saw the disagreement as a way of testing and 
advancing science, while lawyers saw the disagreement as a fruit of adversarial 
culture and looked down on “scientifi c disagreements as signs of moral 
24. This section of the review will focus on neuroscience, although the issues regarding 
accountability that arise in genetics are just as telling.
25. Stereoscope, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stereoscope (last updated Aug. 16, 
2017, 7:24PM), https://perma.cc/NV2M-73TV. That entry also details Holmes’s refi nement 
of the stereoscope:
In 1861 Oliver Wendell Holmes created and deliberately did not patent a handheld, 
streamlined, much more economical viewer than had been available before. The 
stereoscope, which dates from the 1850s, consisted of two prismatic lenses and a wooden 
stand to hold the stereo card. This type of stereoscope remained in production for a 
century and there are still companies making them in limited production currently. 
 Id.
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corruption” (91). And like today, all felt that the adversarial jury trial distorted 
the presentation of scientifi c evidence about insanity (92–93).
Against this backdrop, Blumenthal uses the story of John Ordronaux, 
and his rise and fall as the lunacy commissioner for the state of New York as 
the lens for this dispute. Ordronaux was active in the movement to codify the 
law of the insane as well as to reform and centralize oversight of asylums. He 
labored to “minimize” the diff erences between law and medicine, pointing 
out that while medicine viewed insanity as a departure from one’s natural 
mental condition arising from bodily disease, the law saw it more narrowly as 
determining whether particular conduct was free (and therefore culpable), or 
involuntary (and nonculpable) (92–93). He also, presciently, noted that these 
same “physical laws” aff ected “the judgment process itself” (93). Similarly, 
because Ordronaux felt confi ned to the information about the mind present-
ed by our senses, and that “ ‘no two minds are alike, either in health or in 
disease,’ ” Blumenthal describes him as coming “perilously close” to sug-
gesting that evaluation of sanity was subjective, something that his detrac-
tors raised also (93–94). But in the end, she notes: “Judging competence thus 
proved a profoundly contentious matter, as it became painfully obvious that 
there was no ‘common sense of science’—no agreed upon standard that could 
be used to distinguish the true from the false expert, let alone to decide who 
was actually insane.”26
As the century moved on toward the Gilded Age, advances of science 
became increasingly materialist and determinist.
But Blumenthal is very sympathetic to the knot that medical jurists in fact 
tied for themselves. In attempting to codify something that was admittedly 
“invisible and irreducibly mysterious” (98), medical personnel merely set the 
boundaries of argument at trial rather than settling disputes. In a brilliant 
segue to Part 2 of her book, Blumenthal summarizes the impact that medical 
knowledge had on incapacity trials. As will be familiar to the modern 
litigator, she describes litigating incapacity as a fact-intensive enterprise “with 
‘voluminous’ transcripts . . . the norm” (99), as it was hoped that the details 
could supply what was hidden from view. Shifting to the real object of her 
book, she notes that as the middle class became subject to the vagaries of the 
market and reliant on the self-made man, who himself was being undercut by 
industrial capitalism (99),  it was this “self-made man whose capacity was typically 
challenged in these proceedings” (100). In these challenges, “psychological 
medicine supplied a putatively scientifi c explanatory framework as well as an 
extensive arsenal of words and phrases for conveying how and why they fell 
below the threshold of the default legal person” at the moment of alleged 
incapacity (100). In her account, then, capacity trials showcase the fears and 
concerns of nineteenth-century Americans about their own self-making (100-
01). These accounts also are the fodder of her challenge to traditional accounts 
26. This subjectivity, Blumenthal notes, became a problem for both law and medicine (94).
367Book Review: Law and the Modern Mind
of “law and the conditions of freedom in nineteenth-century America” (102).27 
Responsibility was frequently contested (102), and placing the mind at issue 
was a “Pandora’s Box” that, in marking the diff erence between capacity and 
madness, either became meaningless as too narrow, or tarred everyone with a 
touch of madness. In this, she opines, “judges took a pragmatic tack” between 
voluntarism and determinism (103). By the end of the century, “Common 
Sense” had lost its claim to being capitalized—there was no objective way to 
compare individuals, and judges had to pragmatically make their way through 
the diff erences (103). Ultimately, by the end of the 1800s, all agreed that 
“rationality is not the norm”; rather, the monomania of speculation would be 
the “main show in town” (104).
Her focus on medical experts is deepened in her subsequent case studies. 
For example, in Chapter 3 (“Unnatural Dispositions”), she not only shows the 
working of Common Sense philosophy (113), but also introduces the reader to 
the medical jurisprudence of alienists. At the beginning of her period of study, 
an emerging group of medical experts who styled themselves as “alienists” 
came to the fore (109). They questioned traditional common-law notions of 
non compos mentis, or insanity, complaining that the courts’ use of the concept 
was applied inconsistently (3). Not surprisingly, this emerging medical science 
was widely used in the cases that she so carefully describes.28 In case analysis, 
she shows how not only jurists were befuddled on the shoals of sin, disease 
and depravity, but so too were medical jurists (114–17). The medical experts 
often contested legal outcomes, and she uses this to show that it was not 
only in criminal law that jurists and medical experts had to fi nd a boundary 
“between disease and depravity” as society became more secularized as well 
as medicalized (117). The cases in her two chapters about wills, then, show 
not only a growing secularization of legal doctrines and a wider ambit for 
eccentricity and freedom, but also the development of early psychology as it 
addressed manias, delusions, and self-alienation as alternative explanations to 
sin or depravity for human behavior. Her point, and mine, is that this history, 
especially given the contemporary focus on neuroscience,29 can show us the 
choices that a judge makes in each individual case have a bearing not just 
on the rights of the litigants, but also on the defi nition of human nature, free 
will, American culture, and the limits of science’s role in the courtroom. Each 
case is a picture of how we as a society navigate the bounds of freedom and 
27. This is also a none-too-veiled reference to JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS 
OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
28. She defi nes their use of alienation as follows: “This term of art denoted a loss of reason that 
might be partial or total, entailing an estrangement or dispossession of the self, such that the 
suff erer was no longer in his or her right mind” (3).
29. Perhaps the most salient diff erence between nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology 
and modern neuroscience is that rather than deducing insanity from outward manifestations 
of behavior, we can now, with imaging technologies, both structural and functional, look 
inside the brain. Although, as will be noted below, these technologies are not without their 
limits, both scientifi cally and legally, it should come as no surprise that many of the basic 
questions about freedom and the operation of the human will stay the same.
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responsibility. And, as it pertains to contemporary developments, in which 
neuroscience challenges the “folk psychology” of the courtroom, her history 
allows one to see the contested terrain in which folk psychology developed.
These debates, about the role of science in the courtroom, have not changed. 
That said, two developments change the framework of the debate. The most 
salient scientifi c diff erence now is that modern imaging technologies allow us to 
look into the black box of the mind. On the legal side, some of the evidentiary 
conundrums have been resolved in the adoption of evidentiary standards 
for the admission of expert evidence about mental conditions.30 Modern 
neuroscience and law, however, continue to ask the same questions: What is 
consciousness? Capacity? Who is responsible? Are we determined, or do we 
have free will? But it is important to see the historical connections between the 
accounts of medical jurisprudence in Blumenthal and today’s debate about 
free will, because the latter are the direct descendants of the former and may 
well have as great an impact on American law and the defi nition of the default 
legal person as they did in earlier times. That is, the default legal person lives.
On the scientifi c side, new imaging technologies mean that the brain is 
not quite the black box that it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth and even 
twentieth centuries.31 Technologies such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging and electroencephalograph allow scientists to “see” both structure 
and function in the brain. In many cases, they have allowed us to understand 
that there are, indeed, many types and causes of insanity and to see that many 
types of insanity are organic.
New cases, like the ones depicted by Blumenthal but taking place in the 
late 1900s and early twenty-fi rst century, reveal contemporary thinking about 
the default legal person. Consider, for example, litigation about adolescents. 
Is the adolescent a legally capable adult? In what circumstances? For example, 
30. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 regarding experts, interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert replaces the Frye standard [Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923)] in the federal courts. Both standards, however, provide the presiding judge 
with a set of tools for the admission of expert evidence. Although both look to the reception 
of the science in its relevant community, the Daubert test goes further in announcing a set of 
factors that the judge, as gatekeeper, must consider before admitting an expert. If this test 
had existed in the nineteenth century, it may have resolved some of the debates.
31. Neuroscience is a relatively new area of study; its involvement with the law is even newer. To 
date, there is only one casebook in this area: OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS 
X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014) [hereinafter JONES ET AL.]. Teaching from this 
casebook inspires the subsequent discussion and comparison. For those who seek further 
information, I recommend two sources. First, Francis X. Shen, Keeping Up with Neurolaw: What 
to Know and Where to Look, 50 COURT REV. 104 (2014) (a three-page guide to bibliographic 
and other resources). Second, the comprehensive website for the MacArthur Foundation 
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, http://lawneuro.org/,  contains, among other 
features, an exhaustive bibliography of articles and books on the topic. Law and Neuroscience 
Bibliography, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. & NEUROSCIENCE, http://lawneuro.
org/bibliography.php (last visited 30 August 2017).
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in Roper v. Simmons,32 the Supreme Court, in light of evidence about adolescent 
brain development, concluded that a juvenile off ender could not be put to 
death for a capital crime because of maturational diff erences between the 
adult and adolescent brain. This decision, like many of Blumenthal’s cases, 
was informed by medical and psychological expertise.33 But again, as with 
Blumenthal’s cases, this is contested territory. (Consider, in Roper, the dissent 
of Justice Scalia that questioned the science in this case and its use.34) A danger 
exists here, though, that perhaps we did not face in the nineteenth century. 
Modern neuroscience and medicine have the potential, as yet not reached, 
of demonstrating every person as having a unique mind. Do we face a day in 
which our variability, both genetically and neurologically, is so diverse that we 
all will require capacity hearings? That is, perhaps we are in danger that we are 
all unique, so that lines may be meaningless?
As Blumenthal aptly points out throughout her book, the question of will 
versus determinism bedeviled nineteenth-century psychologists and jurists. 
Although our terminology has changed—now it is determinists, compatibilists, 
etc.—the debate has not. Moreover, these new technologies have not resolved 
the debate about free will. Medical jurisprudence, now as then, is all over the 
board on whether we are determined or have free will.35 But more importantly, 
32. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Along these same lines, see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (a 
juvenile off ender cannot be sentenced to life without parole in a nonhomicide crime, again 
relying in part on psychological evidence).
33. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the Missouri Psychological 
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (No. 03–633), 2004 WL 1636447.
34. As the casebook authors, JONES ET AL., supra note 73, point out, there is the additional 
empirical diffi  culty of when is it appropriate to use group-averaged data in an individual 
case—the G2i problem. Similarly, consider the objections of law professor Stephen J. Morse, 
in Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J.  CRIM. L. 
397 (2006), who suggests that the addition of neuroscientifi c evidence adds little beyond 
what parents and others can already “observe” about adolescents. Id. at 409–10. Others 
have pointed out that the same psychologists have argued that female adolescents, on 
the other hand, can make mature decisions about abortion, pointing out that this type of 
refl ective decision draws upon diff erent areas of the brain and a diff erent social context than 
impulsive, peer-based decisions to engage in criminal behavior. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg 
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and 
the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009). This diff erence, however, is not 
counter to Blumenthal’s argument—indeed, part of her argument is that capacity varies 
depending upon doctrinal context. The same point seems to be emerging in modern uses of 
neuroscience. 
35. Compare the following, all excerpted in JONES ET AL., supra note 73, at 121–47 (Chapter 5: 
Behavior and Responsibility—Views from Law and Neuroscience,: Patricia Churchland, Do We Have Free 
Will?, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 18–24, 2006, at 42; Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future 
of Personhood and Responsibility, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
113 (Jeff rey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011); Jerry A. Coyne, You Don’t Have Free Will, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, at B6; Hilary Bok, Want to Understand Free Will? Don’t 
Look to Neuroscience, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,  Mar. 23, 2012, at B8; Owen D. Jones, The End of 
(Discussing) Free Will, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, at B9; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Free 
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modern neuroscience suggests that categories such as the reasonable person 
or the DLP may prove, increasingly, irrelevant. Some writers in this area, 
particularly Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, of the “trolley problem” 
imaging studies, have suggested that perhaps the issue is that modern science 
may not leave room for concepts of personhood as traditionally understood 
in law and philosophy.36 In their view, although this is contested, the person 
is “disappearing,” as modern science can pinpoint the causes of behavior.37 In 
this light Blumenthal’s study takes on tremendous import in showing us how 
we have traveled from notions of free will into conceptions of determinism that 
emerge from the nascent psychological sciences of the late nineteenth century.
Conclusion 
In 2017, Susanna Blumenthal’s book deservedly won the Merle Curti 
Award for intellectual history from the Organization of American Historians. 
My abbreviated summary does not do justice to her meticulous research or to 
the sweeping breadth of her work. As I read in another review of a diff erent 
Will Is an Illusion, but You’re Still Responsible for Your Actions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, 
at B7; Paul Bloom, Free Will Does Not Exist. So What?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, 
at B10.
36. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004). They state:
We argue that current legal doctrine, although offi  cially compatibilist, is ultimately 
grounded in intuitions that are incompatibilist and, more specifi cally, libertarian. 
In other words, the law says that it presupposes nothing more than a metaphysically 
modest notion of free will that is perfectly compatible with determinism. However, 
we argue that the law’s intuitive support is ultimately grounded in a metaphysically 
overambitious, libertarian notion of free will that is threatened by determinism and, 
more pointedly, by forthcoming cognitive neuroscience . . . . We argue that new 
neuroscience will continue to highlight and widen this gap. That is, new neuroscience 
will undermine people’s common sense, libertarian conception of free will and the 
retributivist thinking that depends on it, both of which have heretofore been shielded 
by the inaccessibility of sophisticated thinking about the mind and its neural basis.
 Id. at 1776.
  Greene further develops his work in MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP 
BETWEEN US AND THEM (2013). As with the nineteenth century, most of the scholarship in 
neuroscience has focused on criminal law. See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and 
the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787 (2004). 
More recently, two leading scientists have written book-length studies about humans, 
violence, and neuroscience: STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY 
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2011); ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS 
AT OUR BEST AND WORST (2017).
37. Of course, such arguments are still subject to the naturalistic fallacy, a.k.a. the is/ought 
problem. For example, Amanda Pustilnik quite aptly points out that even though we know 
a great deal about the mechanism and operation of pain in the human organism, the concept 
of “pain” still has heuristic value as a label that notes the existence and level of moral and 
legal objections to certain types of behavior. Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: 
How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012).
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work: “For a full account, you need to read the book.”38 I hope that this book 
will be read by more than her fellow legal historians, because scholars from 
all the doctrinal areas on which she touches could benefi t from her insights 
about the formation of the modern mind, and responsibility, in the disparate 
disciplines of tort, contract, estates, wills, etc., all richly covered in her book.
Blumenthal presents a convincing and compelling legal history of a critical 
and formative period of American history. Rather than characterize it in 
sweeping generalizations, as prior generations of legal historians have done, 
she drills down into an amazing database of cases and treatises to show us 
what judges, litigants, and medical experts thought they were doing—that 
is, she allows them to speak for themselves rather than imposing a particular 
view of history on them. In doing so, she liberates them from the confi nes 
of traditional scholarship and paints a rich, multidimensional portrait of 
the development of the modern American character. Her unique focus on 
consciousness, broadly construed, means that she focuses not just on the 
law and the capacity decisions she so deftly summarizes, but also on the co-
extensive philosophical, religious, and medical debates of the time. 
As the United States wrestled with notions of freedom, and moved toward 
an industrial society, she shows us how modern Americans were not only 
self-made, but all too often unmade in their pursuit of wealth and freedom. 
With regular references to the status of married women and slaves, she also 
shows a slow movement to enlarge the category of default legal person. While 
it is diffi  cult to capture 150 years of the history she covers in this review, be 
assured that by her last torts-based chapter, she is demonstrating to the reader 
the contested basis of Holmes’s “average man” as a juridical construct, and 
preparing one for the continuing debates that would be staged over liability, 
responsibility, freedom, and consciousness in the twentieth and twenty-fi rst 
centuries. Her nuanced study of the precursors of modern American law 
allow the reader to more fully understand and appreciate the tensions and 
inconsistencies in the treatment of capacity and consciousness; those tensions 
exist today because they existed yesterday. 
Although she writes about the period from 1750 to 1900, I have attempted 
above to extend the salience of her argument to the modern contested terrain of 
neuroscience and law. Because the same fi ghts are still taking place, the lessons 
in Blumenthal’s text are even more important. While the major contribution of 
her book is a careful and successful challenge to legal history orthodoxy about 
the formation of the American mind, she also teaches at least three lessons as 
we go forward. First and foremost: Science is useful for the formation of legal 
doctrine, and consumers of science should be aware that the science may be as 
contested as the law. In fact, we ignore it at our peril. And, invoking the image 
38. James Gorman, Challenging Mainstream Thought About Beauty’s Big Hand in Evolution, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 29, 2017),  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/science/evolution-of-beauty-richard-
prum-darwin-sexual-selection.html?_r=0 (reviewing RICHARD O. PRUM, THE EVOLUTION OF 
BEAUTY: HOW DARWIN’S FORGOTTEN THEORY OF MATE CHOICE SHAPES THE ANIMAL WORLD—
AND US) (2017)).
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of the stereoscope, it may not always be possible to conform two diff erent 
notions of “truth” into one unifi ed picture given the diff erent aims of law 
and science. Second, I suspect that the judicial pragmatism that she depicts, 
the muddling through, is as alive today as it was over a hundred years ago. 
Although channelized through the Rules of Evidence and Daubert, contested 
litigation about legal capacity still draws heavily on scientifi c expertise, and 
judges show a careful and cautious approach to the use of that science. Finally, 
I think that one of her most valuable insights is that the application of science 
in these cases is not transsubstantive. Going hand in hand with the pragmatism 
she reveals, the medical jurisprudence tends to lead to diff ering results and/or 
analyses in each doctrinal area. It would be fascinating, say, a hundred years 
from now for a legal historian of Blumenthal’s bent to look at capacity cases 
in the twenty-fi rst century.
My minor qualms with the book are largely structural. As is the case with 
many scholarly books, the practice of using endnotes rather than footnotes is 
frustrating. This is especially true for legal scholarship in which the footnote 
is an art form; it often does more than identify a source—it helps to develop 
an argument. Second, and more pointedly, this book is based upon a decade 
of research and published law review articles. At times, a lack of editing for 
consistency means that some of the clarity is lost. Given the depth of detail 
Blumenthal uses to make her argument, this is an important point. For 
example, at times, references to the legal scholars she is critiquing are oblique 
rather than explicit.39 A better job of transitioning her articles to book form 
would have improved the ease of grasping her argument. 
These points should not, however, obscure the majesty of what she has 
accomplished in revealing, without imaging equipment, no less, the modern 
American mind.
Leaves, Leaves, lean forth and tell me what I am. Indeed.
39. An example involving Willard Hurst supports this point. At page 30 of her book, she 
states: “One of the most durable narratives in the history and historiography of nineteenth-
century America has cast the law in the role of providing ‘the conditions of freedom.’” In 
the endnotes associated with that discussion, note 11 references the work of Hurst, as well 
as Morton J. Horwitz, Lawrence Friedman, etc. One might have been tempted to insert 
into this sentence, “as Hurst would say” before “the conditions of freedom” to signal to the 
reader the provenance of this phrase. This is a very small point, but for the uninitiated, it 
would be a helpful clarifi cation. Similarly, another reference to “law and the conditions of 
freedom in nineteenth-century America” appears at page 102, and is not footnoted. Again, 
for the newcomer to this literature, a fuller explanation of the received wisdom and clearer 
references to their work, in either the text or the footnotes, would have been appreciated.
